Using a combination of institutional, systems contingency ;md ecological theory, this paper argues and etnpirically demonsdates thai key founding characteristics of international alliances arc etnbedded (interactiveiy related) in one another. Specifically, the technical area of the alliance activity, the intended direction of product/knowledge liows atnong sponsors, and the administrative form o\' the alliances are shown to be interactively related. Further, the concept of entbeddedness was cotnbined with Transaction Cost Economics (TCE} and technological views lo show two founding pattems. One pattern called Hv'bridization was consistent with technological explanations while the second called Dominance was suggested by TCE approaches. The new interactive relationships were identified in two large samples involving US, Japanese and European lirms during a period from 1970 to 1989, Descriptors: strategic alliances, institutional theory
Introduction
International alliances are an increasingly numerous, diverse, and important social and economic mechanism for international :nterfinn adaptation and cooperation (see reviews by Grandori and Soda 1995 and Hagedoorn 1993a) , Prior work provides an array of partially contradictory recommendations on how managers should fomi international a iiances (cf. discussions by Culpan 1993 : Mowery 1988 Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997 : Ring and Van de Vcn 1992 and Williamson 1991 . One comtnon theme across many studies of international alliances is that of embeddednessthe fit among environmental and organizational characi eristics (see Auster 1992; Dunning 1993; Williamson 1991) , Our review suggested that Ihere was liltie agreement about whether international alliances were or should be embedded in their sponsors (e.g. Kogut 1988) . their industries (e.g. Auster 1992), their nations (e.g. Whitley 1994) or some international sociai and economic structure (e.g. Osborn and Baughn 1993) . There is also considerable confusion regarding how to operationali/c embeddedness when international alliances typically involve at least two sccial, econotnic and corporate systems (cT, Granovetter 1986) . The purjiosc of this manuscript is to introduce a more iniegrative perspective of inlernutitinal alliance formalion. It melds key elements from institutional theory, systems contingency theory, transaction cost economics and technological j>erspectivcs to examine ihc issue i>r einheddedness. Ati institulioiuii view is Introduced to suggest that alliance fonnation characteristics tiuiy CDiilnnn to a type of industry embeddedness based on collective icarnIng and inlbrnicd itnitation. This notion of embeddedness leads to specilic empirical expectalions which incor|X)nttc the itUeractive logic of systems contitigcticy theory. This ititcgration yields testable hypoEhcscs conccriiitig very specilic lypcs {)f alliances (two institutionalized subpopulations of aiiiances). These hypotheses are testetl using two c|uito diriercnt large-scale samples. Otic sample tbcuscs i*ii U.S,/.Japanese alliance foiniations. whiie the other incorporates formations beiween Western Europe, Japan and the United States,
Literature Review
What is An International Corporate Alliance?
Part of the confusion in the literature stems from the wide variety of names and meanings attached \o international cooperations among coi-poraiions (cf. Burgers et al. 1993 : Culpan 1993 Hagedoorn 1993a -" Kogul 1988 : Parkhe 1993 and Williamson 1991 , Mere, an international corporate alliance may be defined as a publicly recogni/ed exchatige atid/or Joint value creation arrangement beiween two or more tinns (sponsors) that are headquartered in separate nations where (a) the area for exchange and/or johil value creation is specified and (bl the arrangement is e,\pected to cover several distinct transaetion periods. While this appears to be a fairly standard defitiition (e.g. Contractor anil Lorangf 1988) it differs from nian\' others in three important ways. One, it explicitly separates publicly announced long-tenii associations from simple spot contracts and short-term projects (cf. Park and Llngsoti 1997) . Two. it includes provisions for both exchange and poiential joint value ereatioti {following Toyne's 1989 suggcsiion to emphasize the exchange us the unii of analysis rather than a sponsor). Three, the specific expectations of one sponsor are not explicitly incorporated into the definition. We presume that the sponsors niay or tnay not wani siniilai" strategic benefits from the alliance. In other terms, the definition offered here separates the issues of what an international alliance is anti tiiight provide from how, or the degree to which, one or tnore sponsors tnight appropriate speeilie potential beiiciils from an alliance. Thus, our focus is on alliatices as an organizational mode.
An Institutional View of International Alliances
The receril tlnimatic increase iti the number antl lotigevity of international alliances sugi^ests that thev may be emereint; as, 'ordeiiv, slahle, sociallv integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized or narrowly technical activities" (Selznick 1992: 232) . The quote, of course, is a definition for institutionalization, Denekamp et al. (1997) provide preliminary evidence that certain forms of international alliances which are believed to be institutionalized are indeed shown to be more stable and appear to influence their immediate environment. A popular theme in the institutional literature which appears relevant to the study of international alliances is the study of why organizational practices and structures emerge, become generally copied and. over time, become established as institutionalized or taken-for-granted activities (e.g. Baum and Oliver 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Haveman 1993; Holm 1995; Leblebici et al, 1991; Oliver 1992) . Here, the notion of the embeddedness of the entity in its context, which is based on imitation and confoimity, is seen as the key to understanding institutionalization (see a review by Baum and Dutton 1996) . Institutional processes are typically discussed at the organizational field level within a particular soeiocconomic setting (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989) , By definition, however, many international alliances cut across existing organizational fields and socioeconomic settings. Most importantly, the dominant rule of relationship linking an entity to its setting is an interesting mix of detemiinistn and choice. Some institutional theorists stress that the conformity of the entity to its setting should be from the individual to the firm, the firm to its immediate environment or firms to their socioeconomic settings (see Baum and Dutton 1996) . Some of the arguments here are often consistent with those found in contingency theory (e,g, Donaldson 1985) or population ecology (Freeman and Hannan 1989) . For instance, firms may conform in order to boost their legitimacy because legitimacy may increase their chances of survival. Of course, the trigger for change in most contingency analyses is a firm's performance that threatens its survival (e,g. Bluedorn 1993) , while institutional theorists arc more likely to stress responses to broader factors potentially influencing a whole series of finns (see Powell 1996) . A counter theme in many institutional analyses stresses choice, particularly when the forces facing the entity are either ambiguous or conflicting (see Miller 1996; Powell 1996) . Consistent with Simon's model of bounded rationality, these choices do not occur in either a vacuum of information or with complete rationality. Thus, individuals may imitate to conform to broad institutional forces and still negotiate their social construction of reality within the framework of their existing knowledge. Thus, finns are not expected to be identical to one another, even though many may share many similar characteristics.
Imitation and Embeddedness
Whitley (1994) . among others, has noted that when organizations attempt to expand beyond their national boundaries they implicitly take with them their nation's history of socioeconomic choices. On the international scene. they become representatives of iheir home luitktn. When firms loini an inlernationai aliiatice. of eoursc, each may represent its own liosi socioeconotnic system, Wilhcut a coninionly sliareii soeioeeononiic hi,story. one firm nia\ attempt to impose its system on the olher. Such was apparently the ease for many alliances involving large nniltiriaticnais IVCMII devel(*pcii countries and smaller lii'tiis from less developed nations (see Franko 1971 i. Iknvever, recent reports suggest thai alliances atiiong Ci>mparable (irnis Irotii economically developed nations are increasiniily p<ipular (.see Hagedoorn i993a). Here, sponsors may be generally blocked froin ineiviy replieatitiy the nationally preferred cooperative structures they may have used in their home country. To form an international alliance, sponsors IVoni developetl nations often need to overcome these hisjcric et^otcxlual differences. All sponsors do, however, share one larger institutional setting, that heitiL; the itidustry of the alliance itself. To the degree institutionali/ation proeesses hold, sponsors may copy popular formation iealures for new alliances from within the alliances' industry, as the industry represents the e(>ninion institutional environment (cf, DiMaggio and Powell 1983) , This generai emphasis on the industrial setling a.s a foeus lor iniitaiion is consistent with numentus institutional studies (e.g, Leblebici et al, 1991: Baum and Oliver 1991) , ro the degree that institutionali/atlon holds, the infernal eharacteri,stics of the alliance should be embedded in this larger industrial mass.
The Basis for Imitation
Simple imitation involves copying the historically most popular practices, as these may relieet eollective learning. Here, it is proposed that new international alliance formation characteristics stem from "infoniied imitation', which is merely the process (if copying key visible features of the apparently viable experiments of others llial are involvctl in exchanging andA^r developing highly similar products and services. The term 'infornied imitation" is used to dilTetentiate the proposed treattnent of iiiiitailon from the more common coercive, niimetie antl normative categories suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) . Informed Imitation is narrower in seopc than DiMaggio and Poweil's 11983) more generalized niinictie nieehanism beeatise the sponsors lack a cotnnion cultural base for joint understanding. Further, the sponsors" ktiowledge of international alliance praetices is iikeK to be more limited than their knowletlgc ol" domestic managerial jiractiees. Thus, imitation tnay be restricted to visible aliianee charaelerislics. When lirsi announced, international alliances are typically ascribed in ilie popular press with important speeitic charaeteristies and expected rclatioiiai Duteomes (see Duysters and FilageiliMim l'-)93; Osborn and Baughn !'-)'•)()). I'oi" iiistaiiee. poptilai press aiinoiincenienis rotUiiiely describe the area of alliance activity, the intended llous of" prodticls aiul kiuiwletige ihrough tlie Lillianee. its geiictal adniiiiistrati\'e lortii and ils ex|X'eiei_l iitMc<nnes, Tliese visible characteristics o\' alliances have also been sttidiet! eMensl\ci\' in ilu' literaaiie (see Oshorn and Ihcjiedoorn i*)M7 lor a re\'ie\v)-Other finns hoping for similar outcomes arc expected to imitate speeitic visible alliance characteristics even though they may subsequently modify ihese during operations. Unlike new organizations, sponsors of international alliances are not assumed to desire additional legitimacy by merely copying fonns popular within a given area (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) , Instead, sponsors are expected to imitate apparently viable alliances under the presumption that they would prefer successful relations. However, to isolate the viability of the visible characteristics it is necessary to go beyond traditional institutional theory.
Incorporation of Contingency and Ecoiogical Views
Both structural contingency perspectives (see Bluedom 1993 and Donaldson 1996 for reviews) and population ecology views (see Baum 1996 for a review) suggest that there may be a limited number of viable patterns or combinations of environmental conditions and organizational forms at any one time. There is considerable disagreement among institutional, contingency and ecological scholars over which extemal variables should be considered, the number of potentially viable pattems and the importance of choice. Yet, all suggest that the fit or combination among environmental and organizational characteristics is important for viability. Many institutional analyses attempt to separate institutional, economic and technological factors into separate forces (see Powell 1996 for a discussion). Powell (1996) , among others, has suggested that these factors tnay be co-mingled rather than being inconsistent or orthogonal. Some of the institutional literature explicitly incorporates econotnic and technical ralionalily into the more general analyses of mimetic isomorphism. For instance, Haveman (1993) suggests that mimetic isomorphism ean result from efficient responses to uncertainty. Further, Haveman's (1993) study of market entry is also consistent with Auster's (1992) analyses of new U,S,/Japanese alliance fomiations across several industries with different degrees of development. Both reiterate a theme often heard in population ecology that organizations subjected to the same environmental conditions acquire a similar form (Freeman and Hannan 1989; Hawley 1968) .
If the survival of the alliance is a necessary condition for its viability as an entity, systems contingency theory (e.g, Donaldson 1985) and population ecology studies (e.g. Freeman and Hannan 1989) suggest that there should be an interactive association among the environment and the fomi of the alliance. Note here that the form of embeddedness is a veiy specific 'if-then' statement. This has generally been interpreted in empirical studies as a statistical interaction over and above simple additive effects (see Bluedom 1993) . So far, we have suggested that the alliance's industry is a common environment for the sponsors and a focal point for itnitation. It seems reasonable to propose that international alliances may be embedded in their industrial settings. As discussed in more detail below, the. administrative form of the alliance and the product/knowledge flows through tlie alliance are two theoreticaiiy important and visible alliance-formation charaeteristies. If the sponsors utilize informed imitation and the rule of relationship among the environment, and internal characteristics is interactive, the following may be stated: 
International Alliances as Action Takers
So far, we have suggested that industrial practices are a locus lor imitation. The formation pattem is expected to be consistent with the viability of the alliance as a framework tor the sponsors' collective interests, 1'his vieu' emphasizes both the socially constructed aspects of international alliances and recognizes that the alliance's viability serves as a restraint on unbridled executive choice. An institutional view also suggests that international alliances are not just a framework for the sponsors" actions (adaptation and cooperation) but also action takers (cf. Holm 1995), That is, the alliance may have a function that is separable from those of any one sponsor, even if this function can be related to the sponsor's interests (cf. Holm 1995) . Further, new international alliances are, by definition, experiments in institution building. They are unique, relational institutions. As relational entities, the intetnal eonfiguration of the alliance may refleei its needs as an action taker as well as the interests of the sponsors.
The Administrative Forms of International Alliances
If the intemationa! alliance is an action-taking entity that Is expected to be viable, it is again useful to consider the very large body of research on contingency theory. Studies dating back to the work o{ Burns and Stalker (1961) and Thompson (1967) generally suggest the potential importance of a specific fit between or among (a) an entity's environment, (b) its administrative structure, and/or (c) ils internal throughput (technology). If ii is to be successful (,see Bluedom 1993 , Donaldson 1996 , Many studies of allianees describe the administrative form on a sitigular continuum ranging from conlracts to partial equity forms (Gulati 1995), Institutional and contingency perspectives suggest that distinct types of administrative form may be salient. Consistent with Holm (1995) , there may be distinetly different administrative logics underlying different administrative forms. Sel/.nick, for instance, suggests an 'intrinsic conflict between the premises of contract and those of association (1996: 270)", One eentral contrast is the contractual emphasis on the value of ownership versus an association emphasis on the attentiveness to long-term interests and the structure of authority. Contracts for stipply involve discrete negotiatitni over speeilie pi'ovisions (duration, price, quatitity, quality, and the like) and expected adjustments to recognized, foreseeable contingencies. In contrast, so-called technical agreements to share, exchange and/or develop knowledge or technology rest on an association logic (cf\ Hagedoorn 1993a), Teehnieal agreements represent an understanding of a cooperative relationship between parties for their long-term interests. Consistent with Holm (1995) , this is a logic of association more than a specific protnisc to deliver, for consideration, according to a contract. Thus, while individually based values such as compliance, trust and forbearance may underlie contracts (cf, Parkhe 1993) , the associative framework for action is supported by the expectation of reciprocity in order to sustain the relational entity. The contract and association logics also appear quite different from an administrative logic, such as found in joint ventures. In a joint venture, the sponsors have specified an administrative mechanism to conduct operations within a separate hierarchy (Williamson 1991), Here, the logie of administration rather than contract would seem to dictate. Thus, it is little wonder that analyses of joint ventures often emphasize the more standard administrative issues of control (Gcringcr and Hebert 1989) , the selection and actions of the general manager of the joint venture (e,g, Geringer 1991) as well as the division of ownership shares (e.g. Killing 1982 ).
Product/Knowledge Flows and Interdependence
Part of Thompson's (1967) , now classic, contingency analyses stressed the importance of different forms of interdependence in the flow of work among the parties to an administrative entity. For successful operations, sequential and pooled interdependence called for less elaborate, expensive and responsive fonns of integration than reciprocal interdependence. It called for mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment called for more flexible, responsive and idiosyncratic forms of integration. Descriptions of the product/knowledge flows in most alliance studies have implicitly emphasized sequential interdependence. Whether based on the early trade theories of cotnparative advantage (see Deardorff 1979 for a review), the eclectic theory (Dunning 1979) , the intemalization approach (Rugman and Verbeke 1992), or the literature on entry mode choice (e.g. Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Hennart 1988; Hill et al, 1990) , international alliances have been seen as mechanisms for the unidirectional outward expansion of products and knowledge or as (e.g. Smith and Ziethaml 1993) exploiting some comparative national or firm advantage (e.g, Hennart 1988 ). However, more recent work suggests that alliances are expected to be popular in technologically intensive industries because they are flexible mechanisms that firms can use simultaneously and cooperatively to develop new products and processes and jointly build reciprocal value-added networks (e.g, Auster 1992; Contractor and Lorange 1988; Hagedoom 1993a) . The work flow patterns in these alliances appear to emphasize mutual adjustment through reciprocal exchanges of products and knowledge. Here, the implicit assumption is that both sponsors have important and neeessary eompetencies to contribute to a synergistie effort. Thus, the interdepeti dence should be I'eciprocaL iiol unidirectional. Hven though tiiuch i>f the current alliance literature seems lo use produci/ knowledge flows to charaeteri/c the nature of alliance's reciprocal interdependence, there appears io be a split opinion on how to deal wiih iliffeient types of product/knowledge fli)vvs. On the one hand, ihere are those who emphasi/c transactkni-cosi mitiluii/ation (e.g. Williamson 1991), ikrc. the joint-venture fomi. with ils admuiistrative logic and emphasis oii control, would be preferred over less hierarehieal administrative forms for copini; with the tincertainty sieniniitig from reciprocal fiows and lor monitoring CDinpliance with the iniliai agreement (e.g. Burgers et lil, 1993 Burgers et lil, : llennart 1988 . On the other hand. Hagedoorn uiu! his colleagues (Duysters aiul 1 lagedofirn 1993; Hagedoom 1993b) suggest that the associative logic Ibniul In the agreement form might be moi'e appropriate for siiniulatiiig exchange and development. Osborn antl his eollcagues (see Osborn antl Baughn 1993 : Baughn el al, 1997 ) have a similar argument. They suggest that mutual ct)ntrol in an agreement Ibrin vvlili reelproeal iiitertlependence may he aceotn--phshetl by the |>t)tential threat of one parly to withhold the knowlcd-ie neetled to proceetl \o the next stage of eoiniiierciali/ation.
International Alliance Sub-populations as Specific Patterns of Embeddedness
So far. the Linalysis has attcinplcd to rect)giii/e liie duality and eoinpiexhy of International alliances (soe Osborn and llaged(H>rn l'-)')7), The> are eooperalions (frameworks for action) between sell-interesled corporalions. where these sjionsors are loeated in separate nations iuui cidlures. Executives are expected to imitate other apparently viable alliance'^ in the allianec's industry. Yet, we also suggested thai to form an alliance the executives ncc(\ \o ;igree to a ii)glc i>f assticialion, contract or admiiiistratit)!i antl to establish a pattern of produet/kiitnvletlge exchanges. Sponsors are expeetet! to socially construe! an alliunce consistent with their iiv\ n interests and bargaining power as well as the alliance's functit>n. We explicit!) noted some of the inconsistent recommendations (rom the cuirent literature ctincerning the ehoiee ot administrative forms and produet/knowlediie liows, Mtdding other factors constant (such as natit>na!!ty. corporate si/e antl tiilferciiecs In bargaining pt)\vei). we now etmtenti that some specific enihetl-(tetl et)ivibinali(nis are nn»re likely thai! others. That is. cuiisisient with industry-speeilic conditions and opportunities for ect)noniic and/or teehnieal atiaptatit>ii, stmie e(Hiibinatit)ns of atlministrative form antl product/ kntivvledge flow might be favtuireti over others. While theix' arc potcntiallv iiiiuiy ctnnbinalions, tvvt) arc suggested In the nitnv iratiitiona! alhanee analyses. One is based on transaction cost ect»noniics. I'he sceontl relics niore on Ihe teehnt>lt)i!v literature.
Dominance
Fven in technically stable industries, there may still be considerable uncertainty in forming an alliance aeross national boundaries. Sponsors should be prepared, for instance, to react to a host of shifting national, lirm-specific, and transaction-specific advantages as they struggle in a eontiiuiing battle for global competitive donnnanee (cf. Dunning 1993) . The shifting setting may provide ample opportunities for opportunism (Williamson 1991 (Williamson , 1996 , Thus, tinns may seek the protection of a hierarehieal administrative form (e.g, joint venture). The product/ knowledge Hows arc likely to stem from national or lirm comparative advantages and favour unidirectional rather than reciprocal exchanges. In Thompson's (1967) terms, sponsors will opt for pooled and sequential interdepentlcnce. The pattern of mtire stable industrial condititMis with unidirectional proUtiet/knowletlge flows through equity alliance forms to minimize opptirtunism may be called a dominance pattem. The pattern relleets the untlerlying rationale presentetl by many transaction cost and inlernalization theorists (e.g. Burgers et al, 1993; Dunning 1993; Gulati 1995; Williamson 1996) . In sum: 
Hybridization
Several scholars suggest that intemational alliances are an effective mechanism for coping with specilic technological ctindititins, Differenl authors stress somewhat different industrial challenges, sueh as change and complexity (cf. Auster 1992; Osbtirn and Baughn 1990; Hagedoorn 1993a), technolt)gical discontinuities (Anderson and Tushman 1990) . comniereial complementarities and commercial inseparabilities (Teece 19S6). In many oi' these analyses, the fonnation characteristics t)f intemational alliances are expected to match the technolt)gical requirements. The favoured administrative form in response to diseontiuuitics. uncertainty, commercial complementarity, ctmimercial inseparabilities and/or technoltjgical change may nt)t be simple supply contracts or joint ventures. but agreements (also known as incomplete or relational contracts, see Acs and Gcrlowski's 1996 review). With rapid technological development, potentially eoupled with teehnological discontinuities, sponsors may be unwilling and/or unable to fix the character of the contributions in sufficient detail either to consummate a simple supply contract or specify a joint venture. For example, new commercial inseparabilities often emerge across once separate technical regimes (e.g. hardware and software, design and service in computers or chemistry and biology in biotechnology), Interorganizational alliances may emerge to link once separate areas as a form of mutualism (ef, Barnett 1990), Thus, Instead of unidirectional ilows of products or knowlctlgc through the alliance, sponsors may opt lor reciprocal produet/knowiedge exchanges to develop new coinbinatitms of prtv ductit)n processes, products and services, A technological view discards the presumption that firms should select an administrative ft)nn that minimizes transaction costs. Instead, tinns are required tt) select product/knowledge flows and combinatiitus of administrative forms that increase the chances of sueeessful commercialization and/ or adjustment. The issue is more: How can it be done?; rather than: How efiieientK can il be accotnplished? In hybridization, it is ihe role of the alliance as an action taker that is emphasi/ctl. Thus:
II.'': Within technology-intensive tndustries. chuntcicrized by comnicrciai inscpatability, ttUidiiccs with reciprocal proiluctiknowledgc jiows. cottplcil with ai;rccnicnts as the iidniinistralivc fonn. will be proporiiomtlcly more ntuncnms ihaii un\ other comhination of form utui ficnc direction.
Btith ihmiinance and hybridization appear to be viable eonibinations. The)' are combinations of industry, administrative form and produet/knovvledge Ilows subject to informed imitation. If such is the ease, at least two quite different 'institutionali/ed sub-pt)pulatioiis' oi alliance,^ may be found. While there is a choice of which combination t)f industry, administrative form and product/knowledge flow is selected, some choices are nn»re poptilar and potentially more elTcctive than others.
Sample Selection and Measures
All the empirical literature reviewed relied upon a single sample, were restricted tt) joint ventures or explicitly excluded stinie lypes oi' alliances (e.g. Geringer 1991), oihers concentrated only t)n wiihin-industry alliances by very large corporations (e.g. Gulati 1995), while many were restricted to one specilic industry (eg. Burgers et al. 1993 : Powell et al-1996 ov U) two ctiuntries (e.g. Auster 1992; Osbt^n and Baughn 1990).
Here, the hypotheses were tested in two distinct large data sets covering a wide variety of natittns, industries, alliance types and sptinsor sizes.
Samples
The Iirst sample is a tictailctl ct)lleeti(>n of 625 alliances formed by U.S. and Japanese firms during 1988 and 1989 described by the Japanese F.xlernal Trade Organization (see JFTRO). The second sample eoneerns 762 alliance fonnations between forms headquartered in the United States, Japan and Western Furope between 1970 1989, drawn from the Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators (CATI) information system (see Duysters and Hagedoom 1993) . While 762 new alliances in the CATI data for Japan, L^nited States and Westem Ftirope from 1970 to 1989 appears smull compared to ihc (^25 alliances found in the JFTRO sample for [1988] [1989] . it is imptirtant to recognize that the JETRO data contain information on alliances with relatively stnall Japanese firms which tnay have been missed by the announcements methodology. Furthermore, the JETRO database contains a greater number of long-temi supply agreements, which may be under-rep resented in the CATI database due to its sole reliance upon public announcements. The JETRO data allows for a test of the hypotheses across industries with widely varied firm sizes for alliances fomied between finns in two nations during one time period. In comparison, the CAT! data allows for a test of the hypotheses aeross the ,same industries over a longer time period with a wider variety of nation states being represented. The United States, Japan, and Westem European nations together represent a diverse collection of technically and economically advanced countries where (a) there is extensive trade, (b) there has been a pronounced shift in the intemational division of labour since the end of World War II. and (c) there has been intense cotnpetition in the industries selected for study.
Variables
The testing of Hypotheses 1 to 3 required consistency in measuring the variables across the two unique satnples. Measures of the industry of the alliance, the administrative form of the alliance, and the intended product/ knowledge flow through the alliance are described below.
Industry
JETRO classifies new alliances (not their sponsors) into a standardized technical area code. The codes selected were (i) autos (automobiles and auto parts), (2) computers, (3) information and communication systems, and (4) semiconductors (both chips and equipment). Formations from the CATI data base were also recorded for these same industrial categories. Prior studies suggest that these industries contain the vast majority of international alliances formed atnong firms headquartered in developed nations (see Hagedoom 1993a), Autos and auto parts represent a mature area (see Auster 1992) of intense intemational competition. Between U.S. and Japanese fmns, some consider the Japanese to have had a competitive advantage during the 1988-1989 study period (e.g. Burgers et al. 1993) . The Furopean auto industry is, and was during the study period of the CATI data, a very cotnplex mix of national champions (e.g. France, Germany, Italy) and foreign-owned subsidiaries by such multinationals as GM and Ft)rd, Prior analyses of the remaining industries suggest that they were relatively early in the technological development cycle during the two study periods. Commercial inseparabilities have been considered very important in the rapidly growing computer and infomiation/communication systems industries (see Auster 1992; Pisano and Teece 1989; Yoffie 1994) . Semiconductors were also included because they appeared to be an unstable, high growth area with moderate commercial inseparabilities (sec Borrus 1988 and Yoffie 1994) .
Administrative Forms
Both data sets incltide all types ofallianee forms. They v\cre cotled as supply agreements (long-term contraels for the sale of ctmiponents. produets or ser\ ices from one sp()ns(ir to another or reeiprt)eal exchanges thereof), technical agreements isingle or joint R&D agreements, lieensmg or crtiss/lieensing agreemenls, murkeling or proiUietion agreements Lis well as eombinations oi ihese), jt'int ventures, (the croati(M! tif a separate k\i;al entity) and partial eqtiity purchases,
Product/Knowledge Flows
Both the .lETRO and the (\AT1 tiata seis describe ihe nature of the Ilows of prtxlucts and know ledge exehangctl via the aliianee. In order to capture the tlegi'ee of reciprocal iiiteidependenee, these tkiws were eotleti as either unklireetitinal tir reciprocal, based on the descriptions of the indivklual alhanees, P<ir example, in simple customer-supplier agreements there \s a iiiikiircetit)nai How of jirotiuets from t)ne partner to another, SimiiarK. in licen,sinu, and cross-liecnsing agreements iheie are ilistinelive patterns of single or intitiial teehnology iransler which wtuiltl have been characleri/ed. respectively, as niii(lirecllt)nal antl I'eciproeal.
Methodology and Findings
l-'or btith samples, there were siifiicient numbers of allianees v\iih ai! possible ctimbinatitms to test the interactive hypotheses lor all Industries, with one exception, fhere were but 13 II,S./Japanese alliances in commuiiieatloiis. Sinee analyses tiropping c<immunicatit)ns still shtnved a signilicant triple-order interaction, the tables report eomparahle tIata for all four indns tries for hoih samples. Complete data on alliance eharacteristies were nvaikiblo for ()25 l\S, ,lapii!iese allianees. Of the 625 U.S,/.lapanese allianees InckHJed in the JETRO sample. 177 were supply contracts, 264 w-ere technical agreements and 184 v\'ere jtiint venttnx's and partial et|uity purchases. 431 i>f ihe aiiianees in the Jf-tTRO sample had annt>tincL'd unidirectional product/ kru)wledge nt)ws while 194 liati annoLineed reciprt)cul Hows, There were 131 alliances in semiconductors in the JFl'RO sample while 24^ were in coiiij)uters. 13 in eommunicati(*ns/inft)rmation systems antl 238 in aiittis/ at!H> parts. The (.'.ATI tIata prt)vitietl 762 allianees invtilving Japan, Western Kurope and/or ihe UniictI States. Here, there were 129 suppl>' etmtraets, 344 teehnieal agreements and 289 joint ventures; 305 oi 762 allianees ;innotinced uiiitlireetk>nal product/knt)w ledge lU)ws antl 457 anntnincetl icelpitjcal tloU'S. Similarly, for the CATI tiala, thei*e were 229 in seinictindtietois, Ui9 in eomputers, 227 in etinimtinieations/informalion syslems and 137 in auios/auto parts. The interaetive hypotheses which predicted embetkiedness (Mil was tested hierarchical loe linear analvsis. This nroeeilure is idoallN suited to examining inleraclive associalions amotig categtirical variables (see Dillon and Goldstein 1984 for a discussioti). These results arc contained in Tables  I and 2 tor the JETRO and CATI samples,, respeetively. The findings for the interactive results were completely consistent with HI. There were significant triple-order interactions for both samples. Specifically, industry, product/knowledge flow direction and administrative form were interactively related over and above the additive and second-order effects, as suggested by the inslitutiona! embeddedness hypothesis (HI), An inspection of the data (complete data available from the senior author) indicated mixed evidence for the hybridizctf and dominance patterns predicted in Hypotheses 2 and 3 when viewed across both samples. Consider first Hypothesis 3, which predicted a hybridized pattern involving reciprcx-al iO'/, flows administered via technical agreements within techtioiogy-iiitensive industries wiih polcnlial conimetcial in,separahilitics. In semiconductors and cotnputei's, reciprocal technical agreements were, in fact, disproporiioiiateK more popular than any other cotiihination for both samples, Specilicall>, wiih an even di,stribution o( iorms and Ilows in semiconductors one vvoukl expect 22 reciprocal technical agreements in the JETRO sample while Uie actual number was 40 {j> < ,01); in the CA'fl sample the expected value for semiconductors was 38 and the actual was 85 (/' < ,01), f-or computers, the relevant data were 40 expected reeiprocal technical agreemeiits wiih 75 actual [p < ,01) in JHTRO and 28 expected wtth 46 actual (/> < ,05) in C'ATi, There were too few allianees in eommunieations for the JETRO sample but in (he CAYl data 25 reeiproea! teehnieal agreements were expecled while OS weie Ibiind (/? < ,01). Similarly, Hypothesis 2 predicted that unitlirectional flows administered via equity arrangements shoukl be more ruimeroLts than any othei" (orni in stable tuattire industries. This result was clearly supported foi* autos and auto part,s in the JH'I'RO sample. Thirty-eight unidirectional joint ventures were expecled. but 71 w^^rc foLMKl (p < .01), IKpoihesis 2 was not supported hy the CAFI ,sainple as there was noi a signilicatitly ilisproportionate numbei' of one-way joint venttires l23 were expecied and 32 were fountl with a/' > ,05-Furthermore, the number of equity-based alliatiees with reeiprocal tlow s {5 I) exceeded the number of joint ventures with unidireetional Ilows,
Discussion
For both samples. Hi, concerning enibeddedness, was supported with signiheant triple-order interaction. The administrative forms of inienuUional allianees. ihe Hows oi prodtiels/knowledge ihrough the allianees and their area of ofieratioii (iiuluslry) wci'e embedded in one anoluer at fonnation. These restilts were eonsistent with the proposed insiitutional approaeh Ihat inelutletl eeologieal and eontitigeiie)' views, suggesting embeddedness as higher order interactive relalionship. Within the context of the triple-order interaction suggesting embeddetlness, these results were also generally consistent with the iheoretieal e\peetation of at least one oi ihc two dislinet insiiiutionalized sub-poptilations of alliances labelled hybridi/allon and tlominanee.
Identifiable Sub-populations
Aliianee formation iti teehnoiogy-intensive industries eharaeteii/eil by disconliniiities and eotnmereiai inseparabilities tiisproportionatcly favoured ]"eeiprocal produet/knowiedge tlows in tcehtiical agreetrients. This hybi'idized pattern vv;is most clearly evident in the eomptiier antl semieonduetor technical areas in fiotli ihe JIifRO and CAT! data sets. This pattern appears i|uitc eonsisteni with the theoreiieal expoctallons of infortiied iniitalioti to eope with teehnoioaieal eonditions. Here, international alHanee torniation was consistent with mutualism and an associative logic stressing reciprocal adjustment and development (cf. Auster 1992; Bamett 1990; Hagedoorn 1993b; Osbom and Baughn 1993) . The alliance appears to be configured as an action taker. In autos and auto parts, the analyses of the JETRO formation data revealed a preference for equity arrangements with unidirectional intended product/knowledge flows from Japan to the United States. This dominance pattem at formation appeared quite consistent with that expecled from an economics perspective to reduce transaction costs (cf, Wilhamson 1991) . For instance, intemalization theory would suggest that if Japanese firms were moving to capture nation-specific advantages in the United States to complement tbeir firm-specific advantages (cf. Buckley and Casson 1988; Dunning 1988 ) they would prefer to form unidirectional joint ventures over simple contracts or loose agreements. The CATI database failed lo show Ihe dominance pattern involving unidirectional flows in autos/auto parts. Equity arrangements were predominant overall (83 equity linkages versus 54 technicai and supply linkages), as would be expecled from a iransaction cost logic (Burgers et al, 1993; Williamson 1996) . However, reeiprocal product/knowledge fiows outnumbered unidirectional ilows and the preferred combination was reciprocal flows using joint ventures. Across Europe, the United States and Japan over a twenty-year time span, sitTiple unilateral intemalization did not appear lo operate (Buckley and Cas,son 1988) , Rather than a simple continuous replication of a once preferred combination of the joint venture with a unidirectional flow (see Burgers et al. 1993) , or a simple extension of one firm's competencies (cf. Dunning 1993) , sponsors made a variety of choices regarding product/ knowledge flow. Perhaps the traditional expected dominance pattern has been dc-institutionalized by continued substantial changes in the global auto industry (see Oliver 1992) .
Limitations
Several specific external factors not measured in this study might account for the variations around the dominance theme. In the developed nations studied here, there is a history of very substantial direct (as with the Japanese and many European nations) or indirect (as with the U.S.) government involvement in the automotive industry. Thus, in addition to Whitley's (1994) notion of exporting ,some socioeconomic choices, we suspect the attempt by globalizing fimis in a developed industry to merely expand their (ominance is explicitly muted by govemmental influence or the threat of governmental action. It is also possible lliai parts of this industry are undergoing technological change even though (a) auto design and assembly retnain within the major manufacturers and (b) volume operations remain important due to heavy fixed investments. For the more volume-sensitive iu^eas undergoing change, perhaps the reciprocal joint venture is a compromise that balances inconsistent demands for joitil eommereialization and eost eontrol, A reeiproeal joisit venture may provide suflieietU niutualistn needed for technical develuptiicni and adjtistmeiit while providing the eontrol neeessary lo proteel heavy lixed inveslnients as well as the bureaueralie siandardizatioti neeessary in integrate new technologies into mature faeilities and operations. The econt)n-iic view may still be accurate over time. The inability to elearl_\' measure the viability and survival of Ihe various patterns is bi.)ih Li serious limitation and a ehallenge for j'uture reseai'ch. It is possible, for instanee, ihat ihe propiwed government inlerventioii in the auto hxUistrv did make a difference in formation pailerns. but that the dominance paiterii with unidirectional Mows will be more clearly seen among the longer surviving and more sueeessful alHanees, This study shows a clear trade-off between breadth ami depth, Althotigh the (iata underiying this study are nuieh tnore comprehensive ihan prior studies, this breadth prevented detailed measurement of a host oi variables, Relaiion-specitic Scg, irusi: see Park and Dngson 1993), lirni-speeilic (e,g, charaeteristies of the exeeutive leams and the straiegie intent of the sponsors: Harrigan 1985). industry-speeitic {e.g. R&l) intensity across a broader range oi itidustries; Osbom and Baughti 1990) and nation speciiie Ic.u.. )zo\-crnanee preferences by national govei'ninents: Franko 1971) variables were not measured. Yet, conirols lor firm si/e and similarity in the analyses of the JK'IKO data were not signiticant, nor did national differences intUienee the signilieant linditigs in the C'ATl data. It is possible more speeilie national differences (e.g. government policies, wage rales and imkistrial eompeteiic}. as noted by Whitley 1994) or regional differences (luirope. North Ameriea and Asia) may still be important in charting the sueeess or failure of aMiunces (e.g, Mundell 1994),
Future Research
The ooiieept of informed imitation yielding ihe expectation of generali/eci industry cmbeddedtiess as an interactive relationship among sesling and aliianee eharaeteristies as well as specific institutionalized sub-poptilations helps the analy,st lo link the different units of analysis. The eoneept oi informed imilation involves Joint executive ehoiee by individuals wiihin sponsoring lirms from two sepai'ate tiatioiis concerning eombinations ol industry and alhanee eharacEensiies. Thus, il moves iraditional inslilutiona! theory weli heyoiid its typieal Held and stK'ioeeonotnie boundaries. There is tio expeetation thai executives share a cottmion eultutv, values, or history. They are not eolleclively captui-od by a common ,soeioeconomie setting. Yet. iti spite oi all oi these differences, they ehoose to c(K)|K-rate in similar ways vvheti faeed wiili similar iiulustrial eonditions. In far too many institulional perspeciives eeotiomJe. teehnieal and institutional (social) factors are arliticially separated from one aiioiher into disiinct forces (see Powell 1996 for a discussion). In far too tnany eeotioniie views, the emphasis on the details of the iransaelioti ignores importanl "exogetious factors". If the goal is to explain and prediet raiher ihan sup-port or reject a line of inquiry, this paper suggests that institutional, economic, teehnological and contingency perspectives collectively provide valuable insights into aliianee fonnation. Yet, to utilize these insights calls on the researcher lo violate some apparently sacred traditions -traditions that may not be central lo the causal tnechanistns that are the foeus of Ihe underlying theory (see Dubin 1969) . This work is replele with such "sins', Insiitutional theory is uiili/.ed for international alliance formation where there is no cotntnon socioeconomic or cultural selling -it is being created. Yet, the notion of imitation that is central to this view was supported (see Selznick 1996) . A typical population view emphasizes evolution through the differentia! birth and death rates of organizalional forms (see Astley 1985) under the presutnplion of substantial bureaucratic intransigence (see Freeman and Hannan 1989 ), Yet, via informed itiiitatioti, the paper does show that entities subject to the same environment are similar (see Freeman and Hannan 1989) . While contingency theory suggests thai entities without an appropriate fit will die (see Donaldson 1996) , this study suggests thai alliances with an apparent lit would more likely be viable for imitation. Many analyses follow the tradition established by Harrigan (19S5) suggesting that alliances are ihc children of Ihcir spon,soring parents. Our work suggests that international alliances can be action takers and pursue a variety of goats. While they are created by sponsors and sponsor interest is obviously important, Ihey tnay not be the captive of a single sp(jnsor (see Harrigan 1985) , The traditional conlinuum of administrative fonns so common in transaction eost analyses (e.g. Gulati 1995) was abandoned in favour of examining discrete types (see Williamson 1996) . Yet, the concept that finns are interested in reducing the threats from opportunism and reducing transaction costs was heavily utilized. Rather than foeus on a single specilic technological feature (see Anderson and Tushman 1990) . broader industrial categories were emphasized hei'e as a focal point for imitation. Yet, the characterizations of the industries rested heavily upon prior technology studies (see Hagedoom )993b). Beyond modifyitig existing views and linking them, future studies should also identify the dynamics of informed iiiiitalion over time. At what point does a new institutionalized sub-population emerge? Do all institutionalized sub-populations autotnatically involve the same measured variables identified in this study? For instance, perhaps the next institutionalized subpopulation will involve networks of International alliances (see Osbom and Hagedoorn 1997) . How quickly do new, apparently viable, combinations spread across ihe globe? Do the costs and benefits of various fonns themselves shift over litne? And, of course, when and how is an institutionalized pattern deinstimtionalized (Oliver 1992) ? If executives are boundedly rational, what are these bounds when they are etigaged in intemational alliance fonnation? How do Ihey change over time (e.g. Gulati 1995)? Which organizational eharaeteri,stics appear to tighten or iooseti these bounds? This work suggests ihat a strategic choice for executives involves selection of an institutionalized pattein. However, it is equally obvious that many did not ehoose hybridi/,alion or either variation of dominance. Were they less informed than those who seleeted an institutionalized pattern, or were they eolleeiively attempting to ereate a viable alliance that would work for them to pursue specifie aims be>'otui simple iransaction eost reduction or eommereializalion? Clearh much more theoretical and empirical work is also needed lo estitnate the boundaries on informed imitation and embeddedness. as well as the lypes of sueeess yielded by speeifie embedded palterns (see Dubin 1969) . For insiaiiee, the subsequent viability and relative success ol different embedded eombinations needs lo be empirieally examined, nol automatically assumed.
Conclusions
In line with other papers in this volume, researchers are beginning to see the issue of inter-firm coopei-ation in a inueh more complex tiiaiiner. No singular iheoretieal perspective appears suftieienlly robust to fully explain and predict iniernaiional alliance Ibnnaiion pailerns. Here, ihe analysis centred on the wlioie industry as the focal point for informed imitalion to isolate both generalized embeddedness and specilic pattems. Any researeh study focuses on certain elements, ignoring others. The vast bulk of the literature on intemational alliances focuses almost exelusivc!) on these entities as frameworks for ihe actions of iheir sponsors. This study also recognizes the potential for action lakiiig by alliances. With the incorporation oi institutional theory, this paper also recognizes the soeially eonstrucied aspects of international allianees as experiments in cooperation. It suggests thai the administrative form of the alliance and its product knowledge fiows are einbedded in its industrial setting. This work views some types of aiiiances as emerging institutionalized sub-populations. By balancing deienninism and ehoiee In ihe analysis of international alliance formation and linking an institutional view to more classic perspectives from population eeology and systems eontingeney theory, ihis paper emphasized informed imitation as an underlying causal meehanism, inlortTied Imilaiion based on the apparently viable alliances of others suggested a very specitie form of industry embeddedness. The successfiillv tesled inteipretation of embeddedness was an interaetion among setting and aliianee charaeleristics. The expeetation that industry, administrative tbrtn antl pi-oducl/knowledge flows would be interactively related at formation was eonfinned in two very large and quile dirierent samples, A more detailed expectation for speeifie pailerns of embeddedness ineorporaled work on transaction cosis and technologieal development to isolate two polentially important sub-populations of international allianees. The hybridized pattem (technically intense Industry coupled with reeiproeal product/knowledge Mows administered in technical agreements) was cotifirnied in both samples, antl a|ipears to be one institutionalized sub-populatioii of allianees. Future researeh may identify additional sub-populations consistent with ev{>lving intlustrv dvnamies. 
